

Message Text

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FM USDEL SECRETARY IN BRUSSELS

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DEPARTMENT PASS ATHENS/ANKARA/NICOSIA PRIORITY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, GR, TU, CY

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT FORD AND SECRETARY KISSINGER MEET WITH PRIME
MINISTER CARAMANLIS AND FOREIGN MINISTER BITSIOS OF
GREECE, IN BRUSSELS, MAY 29

1. THE PRESIDENT'S BILATERAL WITH CARAMANLIS MAY 29, COVERED
US-GREEK RELATIONS, PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH THE ARMS EMBARGO
ON TURKEY, CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS, NATO, AND GREEK CONCERN RE THE
AEGEAN.

2. THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS SUPPORT FOR THE RETURN TO DE-
MOCRACY IN GREECE AND ADMIRATION FOR CARAMANLIS' LEADERSHIP.
IN REPLY, CARAMANLIS EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE PRESIDENT'S
ATTENTION TO GREEK PROBLEMS, AND REVIEWED ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF
HIS GOVERNMENT IN RESTORING PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY, SOLVING
PROBLEM OF THE MONARCHY AND PREPARING A NEW CONSTITUTION.
THIS HE SAID WAS BASED ON ARMY'S AND PEOPLE'S TRUST IN HIM
WHICH WOULD BE ERODED IF HE HAD NO SUCCESS IN DEALING
WITH GREEK-TURKISH PROBLEMS.

3. CARAMANLIS REVIEWED HISTORY OF CYPRUS PROBLEM BEGINNING
WITH THE JUNTA'S MOVE AGAINST MAKARIOS. HE ACKNOWLEDGD
THAT THE TURKS ACTED LEGITIMATELY AS A GUARANTOR POWER
IN JULY 1974, BUT SAID THEY HAD NO RIGHT TO REMAIN OR
TO OCCUPY 40 PERCENT OF THE ISLAND. HE HAD FACED AN EXPLOSION
IN HIS ARMY, SOME OF WHOM DEMANDED THAT HE DECLARE WAR.

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HE HAD THREE CHOICES -- WAR, WITHDRAWAL FROM POLITICS,

OR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE MILITARY SIDE OF NATO -- AND HAD CHOSEN THE THIRD AS THE LEAST PAINFUL.

4. RE CYPRUS, CARAMANLIS SAID GREECE ACCEPTED GEOGRAPHIC FEDERATION ON CONDITION THAT THE TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY THE TURKS SHOULD BE IN RELATION TO THE POPULATION AND THE SOLUTION SHOULD ALLOW FOR A RETURN OF REFUGEES.

5. RE THE AEGEAN, CARAMANLIS SAID GREECE FAVORED THE STATUS QUO, BUT THE TURKS WERE CREATING PROBLEMS OVER THE CONTINENTAL SHELF AND ITS CORRIDORS WITH A VIEW TO SPLITTING THE AEGEAN, WHICH WOULD LEAVE MANY GREEK ISLANDS IN A TURKISH SEA. THE TURKS HAD REFUSED IN ROME TO DRAW UP THE DOCUMENTS TO REFER THE ISSUE TO THE ICJ. IF THE PROBLEM WERE PROLONGED, IT COULD EVEN LEAD TO WAR. HE SUGGESTED A RETURN TO A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO AVERTING THIS DANGER. HE SAID IT WAS FOR THE US TO DECIDE HOW IT COULD HELP.

6. THE PRESIDENT REITERATED THE US DESIRE TO CONTRIBUTE TO A SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS AND AEGEAN PROBLEMS WHICH HAD BEEN UNFORTUNATE FOR NATO AND HAD CREATED DOMESTIC PROBLEMS, INCLUDING THE CUT OFF OF ARMS FOR TURKEY. THIS LESSENED US INFLUENCE WITH THE TURKS AND ABILITY TO GET CONCESSIONS. HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS IN VIENNA, BUT US LEVERAGE WOULD REMAIN LIMITED AS LONG AS THE EMBARGO REMAINED.

7. THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN TURKEY BASED ON HIS TALKS WITH TURKISH LEADERS, INCLUDING DEMEREL'S PROBLEMS WITH HIS COALITION PARTNERS AND THE OPPOSITION. HE SUGGESTED IT WAS TIME FOR MOVEMENT TOWARD A RAPID SETTLEMENT IN WHICH THE TURKS WOULD GIVE UP SOME TERRITORY, AGREE THAT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD HAVE SOME POWERS AND ACCEPT SOME REFUGEE RETURN. HOWEVER, WITH THE ARMS EMBARGO THE TURKS HAD A PRETEXT FOR DOING NOTHING.

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8. CARAMANLIS COMPLAINED THAT GREECE WAS BEING ASKED TO PAY FOR TURKEY'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS. WHILE NEITHER THE THREAT OF AN ARMS CUTOFF NOR THE CUTOFF ITSELF HAD BEEN HELPFUL, HE COULD NOT PUBLICLY APPROVE OF RESTORING AID, THOUGH HE HAD MADE NO PUBLIC STATEMENT AGAINST IT. THE PRESIDENT SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS POSITION BUT SAW LITTLE CHANCE OF A CYPRUS SOLUTION UNTIL THE EMBARGO HAD ENDED.

9. CARAMANLIS EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT WITH PROSPECTS FOR AN HONORABLE CYPRUS SETTLEMENT AND SUGGESTED THAT SINCE THE TURKS WERE AT FAULT THEY WERE THE ONES WHO SHOULD BE PRESSURED RATHER THAN THE GREEKS. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF A PUBLIC STATEMENT WERE MADE THAT THE US WOULD NOT TOLERATE MILITARY ACTION IN CONNECTION WITH THE GREEK-TURKISH DISPUTE. HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD MAKE THE TURKS MORE REASONABLE.

10. THE PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED US OPPOSITION TO ANY MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE AEGEAN AND IT WAS AGREED THAT THE SECRETARY WOULD, IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE LATER THAT DAY, EXPRESS US OPPOSITION TO MILITARY ACTION OR THREAT OF MILITARY ACTION BY EITHER SIDE. (THIS WAS DONE).

11. IN CLOSING, CARAMANLIS CLARIFIED HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD NATO TO THE EFFECT THAT GREECE COULD NOT RETURN TO THE ALLIANCE UNTIL THE PROBLEM HAD BEEN RESOLVED. THE PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT THE US WANTED GREECE BACK IN NATO AND WOULD DO ALL IT COULD TO HELP SOLVE THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE SECRETARY AND BITSIOS WOULD CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION THE FOLLOWING DAY.
KISSINGER

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